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Abstract In this paper I argue that English exceptive constructions introduced
by except that appear to have a phrasal structure can be underlyingly clausal. I
offer a compositional analysis for such exceptive constructions. I propose that an
except-clause introduces quantification over possible situations and provides the
restriction for this quantification. I show how this analysis derives the inferences
exceptives come with and the known restrictions on their use.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I discuss English exceptive constructions introduced by except like the
one given in (1). I argue that (1) can be derived from (2) by ellipsis and I propose a
semantic theory that relates the main clause containing universal quantification over
girls and the except-clause in such a way that the inferences that (1) comes with are
predicted and the known restrictions on the use of exceptives are derived.
(1) Every girl was there except Eva.
(2) Every girl was there except Eva was not there.
The existing literature on exceptives has established that when they operate on
universal quantifiers like in (1) they contribute the inferences provided in (3), (4),
(5) (Keenan & Stavi 1986; Hoeksema 1987; von Fintel 1993, 1994).
(3) The Domain Subtraction: Every girl who is not Eva was there.
(4) The Containment Entailment: Eva is a girl.
* I developed the ideas presented here in my UMass Amherst dissertation. I am grateful to my advisors
Seth Cable, Kyle Johnson, Rajesh Bhatt, Barbara Partee for all of their help with this project. I
would also like to thank Petr Kusliy, Peter Alrenga, Daniel Altshuler, Kai von Fintel, Aron Hirsch,
Roumyana Pancheva, the audiences of Susurus and the Semantics workshop at UMass, the audience
of SALT-29 for their comments and suggestions.
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(5) The Negative Entailment: Eva was not there.
The domain subtraction is the inference that if Eva is removed from the domain
of the quantifier, the quantificational claim is true. The containment inference is
that the individual introduced by except is contained in the restrictor. The negative
inference is that the main predicate does not hold of this individual. Another known
fact is that exceptives are not compatible with existential quantifiers (Horn 1989;
von Fintel 1993, 1994).
(6) The Distribution Puzzle: # Some girl was there except Eva.
The existing semantic theories of exceptives are based on the assumption that
an exceptive introduces a DP that is interpreted as a set (Hoeksema 1987, 1995;
von Fintel 1993, 1994; Moltmann 1995; Gajewski 2008) or an atomic or plural
individual (Hirsch 2016). Thus, the element an exceptive introduces can be put
together with a predicate in the restrictor in a direct way. If in (1) except introduces
a set containing just Eva, it can be directly subtracted from the set of girls in the
restrictor of the quantifier. The inferences that Eva is a girl and that she was not there
can be captured if we adopt von Fintel’s (1994) idea that an exceptive also states that
if the subtraction does not happen the quantificational claim is not true. If it is true
that every girl who is not Eva was there, but it is not true that every girl was there,
those two inferences follow naturally.
It has been argued in the recent literature that this picture is not right at least
for some exceptives. Perez-Jimenez and Moreno-Quiben (2012) argue that Spanish
exceptives can host reduced clauses. Soltan (2016) makes the same point about
Egyptian Arabic and Potsdam (2018) about Malagasy. In this paper, I argue that
sometimes what follows English except can only be understood as a remnant of a
clause.
English except can be followed by a PP as in (7) or by multiple syntactic
constituents as in (8) (this example is from (Moltmann 1995)). In (7) the preposition
inside except makes a contribution to the overall meaning of the sentence1. For cases
like (8) ellipsis seems like the only option as the syntactic elements inside except do
not form a constituent.
(7) I got no presents except #(from) my mom.
(8) Every girl danced with every boy except Eva with Bill.
I argue that when exceptives host PPs the traditional approaches to their semantics
do not work. It is generally assumed that PPs denote sets of individuals. However,
1 An example structurally similar to (7) was discussed by Potsdam & Polinsky (2019) independently,
who also argued that exceptives introduced by except can be underlingly clausal.
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often a PP following except does not denote a set that can be used to restrict the
domain of a quantifier in the right way. In (9), the PP from Barcelona introduces
a set of things that are from Barcelona. However this is not a useful set because
things that are from Barcelona are not cities. Subtracting this set from the set of
cities in Spain will give us the same set, as shown in (10), thus, the domain of the
quantifier will not be restricted in the relevant way. For the same reason we cannot
conjoin the quantificational claim with domain subtraction and the statement that
if the subtraction does not happen, the quantificational claim is not true in order to
derive the inferences that Barcelona is a city in Spain and that I did not meet any
student from that city. We also cannot directly say that Barcelona is a city in Spain,
because except does not have access to a constituent that refers to Barcelona.
(9) I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona.
(10) {x: x is a city in Spain}-{y: y is from Barcelona}={x: x is a city in Spain}
However, the inferences associated with exceptives are present in this case as
well. The sentence is true if I met a student from every city in Spain other than
Barcelona. The containment entailment is there too: Barcelona has to be a city in
Spain, as shown by the infelicity of (11). The negative inference that I did not meet
a student from Barcelona is present in (9) as well. Examples like (9) show us that
semantically except is not looking for a set of individuals.
(11) # I met a student from every city in Spain except from New York.
2 Underlying structure of reduced exceptives
I propose that the underlying structure of an except-clause operating on a positive
universal statement is as shown in (12) and the structure of an except-clause operating
on a negative statement is as shown in (13) (where the crossed-out part corresponds
to the elided material). As the reader can notice, there is negation in the ellipsis site
in (12) and there is no negation in the ellipsis site in (13).
(12) Every girl was there except Eva was not there.
(13) No girl was there except Eva was there.
I use NPIs as a diagnostic for the presence or absence of negation in the ellipsis
site. There is a contrast between (14) and (15). This contrast is not predicted by any
existing semantic theory of exceptives2 .
2 Moreover, not all exceptive constructions in English behave this way. For example, exceptives
introduced by but do not show a similar contrast with respect to NPI licensing between cases when
they operate on a universal quantifier (*John danced with everyone but any girls from his class) and
when they operate on a negative quantifier (*John danced with no one but any girls from his class.)
They also cannot host anything larger than DPs (*John danced with no one but with Eva).
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(14) John danced with everyone except with any girls from his class.
(15) * John danced with no one except with any girls from his class.
This contrast follows in a straightforward way if my assumptions about how the
ellipsis is resolved in the two cases are correct. The underlying structure of (14) is
as shown in (16) and the underlying structure of (15) is as shown in (17).
(16) John danced with everyone except [John did not dance with any girls from
his class].
(17) * John danced with no one except [John danced with any girls from his
class.]
It is generally assumed that NPIs are licensed in a downward entailing (DE)
environment (starting from the work of Fauconnier (1975, 1978) and Ladusaw
(1979)). I adopt here the constituent-based approach to NPI licensing (Chierchia
2004; Gajewski 2005; Homer 2011), according to which an NPI is licensed if there
is a syntactic constituent containing that NPI which constitutes a downward entailing
environment. For example, if we consider the entire sentence (18) the NPI anyone
from his class is not in a downward entailing environment, because two negations
cancel each other out. However, the NPI is licensed here because there is a syntactic
constituent that is a downward entailing environment for that NPI, namely the
embedded clause in brackets. In a similar way, there is such a constituent, namely,
the phrase in brackets, in (16), but not in (17).
(18) I don’t think that [John did not dance with anyone from his class].
It is crucial to point out here that if we consider the entire sentence (14) the NPI
is not in DE environment. The claim with a larger exception in (19) does entail the
the claim with a smaller exception in (20). The problem is with what happens with
the domain of quantification when we go from (19) to (20): it gets larger. Let’s
consider a scenario where one of the girls in John’s class has black hair. The domain
of quantification in (19) does not include her (he danced with everyone who is not
a girl in his class). The domain of quantification in (20) includes her: he danced
with everyone who is not a blond girl from his class, thus, he danced with her. A
universal claim restricted to a certain set does not grant the inference that the claim
where that set was substituted by its superset is true.
(19) John danced with everyone except with girls from his class.
(20) John danced with everyone except with blond girls from his class.
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It has been argued in (von Fintel 1999) that what is relevant for NPI licensing
is a Strawson DE environment and not just a DE environment3. A sentence X
Strawson-entails another sentence Y if the truth-conditional content of X entails the
truth conditional content of Y if the presuppositions of Y are satisfied.
However the NPI in (14) is not in a Strawson DE environment. The only way
the NPI could be in such an environment in (14) is if the quantificational claim were
presupposed and the negative claim were the only at-issue contribution of except. In
that case we could say that (19) Strawson entails (20): the claim that John did not
dance with girls from his class does entail that John did not dance with blond girls
from his class. The problem is that the quantificational claim is not contributed at
the presuppositional level. This is shown by the question test in (21). When it is
pronounced with a neutral intonation it is understood as a question about whether
John danced with everyone who is not a girl from his class.
(21) Did John dance with everyone except with girls from his class?
To conclude, we don’t want to create a semantics for except that would predict
that the NPI in (14) is in a downward or Strawson downward entailing environment
globally. The remaining option is that the NPI is licensed locally.
The next question I address here is how it is possible that a positive sentence
serves an antecedent for ellipsis of a constituent containing negation. Rudin (2019),
following Kroll (2016), reports that polarity mismatches of this kind are allowed in
sluicing. This is illustrated in (22). As Rudin points out, not all English speakers
find this sentence completely acceptable.
(22) Do this or explain why you did not do this. (Kroll 2016)
However, there are other completely acceptable cases where a polarity mismatch
is allowed in ellipsis. One example from Russian is given in (23). The n-word that we
see in (23) requires the presence of a clause-mate negation, as the contrast between
the two versions of (24) shows (Brown 1999; Pereltsvaig 2002). The presence of an
n-word in (23) signals that there is a polarity mismatch between the antecedent and
the ellipsis site and makes it possible to reduce the constituent containing negation.
3 This notion was introduced by von Fintel (1999) in order to account for the NPI licensing pattern
in sentences like Only John read any books. The fact that the NPI any books is licensed here is
surprising because it is not in a DE environment: Only John read books does not entail Only John
read ‘War and Peace’. From the fact that only John read books we cannot conclude that he read ‘War
and Peace’. However, it is generally assumed that only presupposes that its prejacent (the statement
without only) is true and does not assert it (Horn 1992, 1996; Atlas 1993). If we limit ourselves to
looking at the worlds where the presupposition of the second sentence is satisfied, the entailment
does hold: if we know that no one other than John read books and we know that John read ‘War and
Peace’, we can conclude that only John read ‘War and Peace’. This calls for a new generalization
about NPI licensing: NPIs are licensed in Strawson downward entailing environments.
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In a similar way, I propose that except in (16) signals that a polarity mismatch is
possible and licenses deletion of the constituent containing negation.
(23) Vanya
Vanya
prines
brought
tri
three
knigi,
books,
a
and
ja
I
ni
N-word
odnoj.
one
‘Vanya brought three books and I did not bring any.’
(24) Ja
I
*(ne)
*(not)
prines
brought
ni
N-word
odnoj
one
knigi.
book
‘I did not bring any books.’
3 The semantic relationship between a quantificational clause and an excep-
tive clause
Given what we have established about the underlying structure of except-clauses,
in (12), repeated below as (25), except needs to relate the two clauses in (26) and
(27) in such a way that the inferences and the distributional facts discussed in the
beginning of this paper are captured.
(25) Every girl was there except Eva was not there.
(26) The quantificational claim: Every girl was there.
(27) The clause introduced by except: Eva was not there.
Speaking informally, I propose that the except-clause in (25) contributes three
things. First, it states that the clause in (27) is true in the situation of evaluation. This
captures the negative inference. Second, it states that there is a law-like relationship
between (26) and (27). It is expressed via universal quantification over possible
situations: in every situation where Eva was not there, the quantificational claim in
(26) is not true. This achieves three things. It gives us the inference that Eva is a girl.
It controls the ellipsis resolution and ensures that the ellipsis is resolved with the
right polarity. It gives us the solution for the distribution puzzle too: it ensures that
if the quantification claim is existential, the result of putting it together with except
is not well-formed. The last contribution of except is that it states that had (27) been
false, (26) would have been true. This captures the domain subtraction inference.
Now, before I show how to get this result compositionally, I will express those
three claims formally. Let’s assume that s0 is the topic situation, the situation with
respect to which the quantificational claim is evaluated. The contribution of except
that captures the negative inference is expressed as (28).
(28) ¬Eva was there in s0
The second contribution of except is as shown in (29), which is logically equiva-
lent to (30).
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(29) ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→¬∀x[x is a girl in s0 → x was there in s]]
(30) ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→ ∃x[x is a girl in s0 & ¬x was there in s]]
This is the claim that establishes a law-like relationship between the two clauses.
The key ingredient here is the fact that the situation with respect to which the
predicate girl is evaluated is s0, so its extension remains constant across possible
situations. This is done because a person can be a girl in one possible situation and
not be a girl in another situation. We are trying to capture the inference that Eva
is a girl in the topic situation s0, we do not care about her gender and age in other
possible situations. (30) can only be true if Eva is a girl in s0. This is because the
universal quantification over situations is only restricted to situations where Eva was
not there. What we know about those situations is that in every one of them there is
an individual who is a girl in s0 who was not there. This can only be Eva.
Let’s consider what happens if we substitute the female name Eva by a clearly
male name, such as John, as shown in (31). (31) is not true: there is a possible
situation, where every individual who is a girl in s0 was there. In that situation, there
is no individual who is a girl in s0 who was not there. One important thing to note
here is that (31) is not going to be true in a scenario where John has a girlfriend who
always follows him and if he is not there, she is not there in s0. This is because the
quantification over situations is not restricted to situations that are most similar to
the actual topic situation. The quantification is simply over all situations where John
was not there. In some of them this girlfriend of John’s was there in others she was
not. (31) can only be true if John is a girl in s0.
(31) ∀s[¬John was there in s→ ∃x[x is a girl in s0 & ¬x was there in s]]
I have shown how the claim in (29) captures the containment inference. As was
said earlier, this aspect of meaning is also responsible for the polarity in ellipsis
resolution and for the fact that except is not compatible with existential quantifiers.
This is discussed in detail later in the paper after I show how the except-clause and
the quantificational claim are put together in a compositional manner.
The next step is to express the domain subtraction in terms of quantification over
possible situations. What we want to capture is shown in (32). However, we cannot
do this directly, because we do not have access to the constituent that refers to Eva.
(32) ∀x[(x is a girl in s0 & x is not Eva)→ x was there in s0]
I propose that we can express (32) in terms of quantification over possible
situations. As a first approximation, let’s look at (33).
(33) ∃s[facts in s about individuals other than Eva being there are the same as in
s0 & ∀x[x is a girl in s0→ x was there in s]]
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This says that there is a possible situation where the facts about people other
than Eva being there are the same as in s0 and where everyone who is a girl in s0
was there. This is only possible if every person who is a girl in s0 and is not Eva was
there in s0. It is worth pointing out that the predicate girl is again evaluated with
respect to the actual topic situation in s0. This is done because the extension of this
predicate can vary with different possible situations, but we only care about people
who are girls in s0.
The question is how to get the relevant restriction for the quantification over
possible situation (‘facts about individuals other than Eva being there’) when all we
have is the sentence Eva was not there. I propose that we can use the fact that it is
standardly assumed that a remnant of ellipsis is marked with focus. The remnant of
ellipsis is Eva. Thus, we have access not only to the clause itself, but also to the set
of its focus alternatives. Following (Rooth 1985), I assume that focus alternatives
are computed by making a substitution in the position corresponding to the focused
phrase.
Under a simplifying assumption that the only individuals in the world are Eva,
Anna, Ivy, Mary and John, the set of focus alternatives for EvaF was not there not
equal to the original proposition is as shown in (34).
(34) {λ s’. Anna was not there in s’, λ s”. Ivy was not there in s”, λ s”’. Mary was
not there in s”’, λ s. John was not there in s}
The quantification over situation can be restricted to the situations shown in (35).
(35) λ s.∀p[p∈(34)→ p(s0)=p(s)]
If Anna was there in s0, the set in (35) picks the situations where she was there:
[λ s’. Anna was not there in s’] (s0)=0, thus (35) picks the situations where it is false
that Anna was not there, therefore we are looking at the situations where Anna was
there. Thus, we can express (33) more formally as (36)4.
(36) ∃s[∀p[(p6=[λ s’.¬Eva was there in s’] & p∈JEvaF was not thereKg,F)→
p(s)=p(s0)] & ∀x[x is a girl in s0→ x was there in s]]
The claim in (36) can only be true if all the girls who are not Eva were there
in s0. (36) says that there is a possible situation s where every individual who is a
girl in s0 was there in s. It also says that in that situation the ‘not being there’ facts
for the people other than Eva are the same as in s0. Consequently, this can only be
true if every girl other than Eva was there in s0. To conclude, this claim captures the
domain subtraction inference we aim to capture here.
4 The superscript F (JKF) means the the focus value is computed.
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In this work I treat the domain subtraction as the only at-issue contribution of
except. I will assume that the parts of the meaning that are responsible for the con-
tainment inference and the negative inference are contributed at the presuppositional
level. The containment inference is definitely not contributed at the at-issue level.
For example, the question in (37) cannot be interpreted as a question about Eva
being or not being a girl as confirmed by the infelicity of the answer in (37).
(37) A: Was there every girl except Eva?
B: # No, Eva is not a girl.
The facts about the negative inference are less clear. The answer in (38) is
felicitous if the question in (37) is asked with an emphasis on except. It is possible
that this signals that the question is asked metalinguistically. I will treat the negative
inference as another presuppositional component contributed by except. The reason
behind this choice is that it is possible to conjoin the claim that expresses the negative
inference of a sentence with except and a quantificational claim with except as shown
in (39). If Eva was not there were contributed at the at-issue level in (39), (39) would
have been as bad as (40).
(38) B: No, Eva was there too.
(39) Eva was not there, but every girl except Eva was there.
(40) # Eva was not there, but every other girl was there and Eva was not there.
4 The compositional analysis
4.1 Universal quantifiers
In this section I show how the meaning discussed in the previous section is derived
compositionally. I implement these ideas in the system where variables over situa-
tions are introduced in the syntax along with binders of those variables (Percus 2000;
Kratzer 2019; Keshet 2008; Schwarz 2009, 2012). I assume that situations are parts
of possible worlds (Kratzer 1989, 2002; Schwarz 2009; Kratzer 2019). Nothing said
here requires possible situations as opposed to possible worlds.
The LF I propose for (25) is given in (41). In this LF except-clause undergoes
quantifier raising.5 It leaves a trace of type s (s2). A binder for this trace 2 is merged
in the syntax. This binder is merged above the binder 1 that binds the situation
5 This structure does not have to be derived by movement. Another possibility is that it is base-
generated. The reason I derive it with movement here is that I don’t want to a priori assume that when
except appears in a connected position (the position directly following a quantificational phrase) it is
non-elliptical. If there are exceptives that appear in connected positions on the surface and are clausal
I propose that they undergo QR along the lines described here.
428
Semantics of clausal exceptives
variable inside the VP – the variable with respect to which the main predicate of the
quantificational clause is evaluated. This is done because, as was said earlier, we
want to fix the extension of the predicate in the restrictor of the quantificational claim
to the actual topic situation. The exceptive phrase has its own situation variable s3.
This one is bound by the matrix lambda abstractor. This is the situation with respect
to which the entire sentence is evaluated.6 Following standard assumptions and the
earlier discussion, I marked the remnant of ellipsis with focus.
(41)
IP
IP
ExcP2
s3ExcP1
IP
was not thereEvaF
except
IP
2IP
IP
VP
was there s1
DP
NP
s2girl
D
every
1
3
The denotation of the sister of the Exceptive Phrase2 (ExcP2) is shown in (42).
(42) λ s’.λ s”. ∀x[x is a girl in s’→ x was there in s”]
No separate denotation is given to except: the meaning is assigned to a constituent
consisting of except and a clause. This is done because we need to make reference
to the focus alternatives of a clause following except. It combines with a situation
(with respect to which the entire claim is evaluated) and with a constituent of
type <s<st>> - the type the sister of ExcP2 has. It introduces the presupposition
consisting of two conjuncts. The first one is the one establishing the law-like relation
between the clause following except and the quantificational claim. The second
one is that the clause following except is true in the situation of evaluation. The
at-issue contribution of this constituent is the domain subtraction expressed in terms
of quantification over possible situations discussed in the previous section.
(43) Jexcept φKg =λ s’.λM<s<st>>: ∀s[JφKg(s)=1→¬M(s’)(s)=1] & JφKg(s’)=1.
∃s[∀p[(p6=JφKg & p∈JφKg,F)→ p(s)=p(s’)] & M(s’)(s)=1]
6 I assume that there is also a local situation variable inside the clause following except that is bound
by its own binder. It is not shown in (41) for simplicity of exposition, as this does not play any role in
explaining the phenomenon we are interested in.
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The resulting interpretation for the entire sentence is given in (44) (the presup-
position) and (45) (the assertive content). As the reader can verify, this is the desired
result discussed in the previous section.
(44) J(41)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→¬∀x[x is a girl in s0
→ x was there in s]] & ¬Eva was there in s0
(45) J(41)Kg (s0) =1 iff ∃s[∀p[(p6=[λ s’.¬Eva was there in s’] & p∈JEvaF was not
thereKg,F)→ p(s)=p(s0)] & ∀x[x is a girl in s0→ x was there in s]]
4.2 Negative quantifiers
In this section I show how the semantics proposed here correctly captures the
meaning of negative quantificational claims with except-clauses.
Following the earlier discussion, in cases when reduced except-clauses operate
on negative quantifiers, the ellipsis is resolved positively, as shown in (46).
(46) No girl was there except Eva was there.
The sentence in (46) comes with the inferences given in (47), (48), (49). Those
are the inferences the analysis aims to capture.
(47) The Domain Subtraction: No girl who is not Eva was there.
(48) The Containment Entailment: Eva is a girl.
(49) The Positive Entailment: Eva was there.
The LF for (46) is given in (50).
(50)
IP
IP
ExcP2
s3ExcP1
IP
was thereEvaF
except
IP
2IP
IP
VP
was there s1
DP
NP
s2girl
D
no
1
3
The denotation of the sister of Exceptive Phrase2 is given in (51):
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(51) λ s’.λ s”. ¬∃x[x is a girl in s’ & x was there in s”]
The interpretation predicted for the entire sentence is given in (52) (the presup-
position) and (53) (the assertive component).
(52) J(50)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[Eva was there in s→ ∃x[x is a girl in s0
& x was there in s]] & Eva was there in s0
(53) J(50)Kg(s0) =1 iff ∃s[∀p[(p6= [λ s’.Eva was there in s’] & p∈JEvaF was
thereKg,F)→ p(s)=p(s0)] & ¬∃x[x is a girl in s0 & x was there in s]]
The first conjunct in (52) is responsible for the inference that Eva is a girl. This
is because it says: take any situation where Eva was there, what you will find is
that there is a girl from s0 who was there. The second conjunct gives us the positive
inference that Eva was there. The assertive contribution in (53) can only be true if
no other individual who is a girl in s0 was there in s0. This is because it says that
there is a possible situation where the truth value of every proposition of the form ‘x
was there’ (where x is an individual other than Eva) is the same as in s0 and no girl
from s0 was there.
5 Polarity is controlled by the meaning
In this section I show how the semantics proposed here controls the ellipsis resolu-
tion, specifically how it forces the ellipsis to be resolved with the right polarity.
I have argued that when an except-clause operates on a positive universal quan-
tificational claim, the ellipsis site contains negation. When an except-clause operates
on a negative generalization, ellipsis is resolved positively. One such example was
discussed in the previous section and another one is given in (54).
(54) Every girl was not there except Eva was there.
I propose that the ellipsis resolution is restricted by the meaning of a sentence.
In other words, we are free to resolve ellipsis positively or negatively. However, if
the clause with the wrong polarity is chosen, the presupposition generated by the
system is not going to be satisfied.
Let’s consider the presuppositions generated for (55) given in (56). The first
conjunct in (56) (in bold) is false. This is because it is not the case that in every
situation where Eva was there, there is an individual who is a girl in s0 who was
not there. There is a possible situation where Eva was there along with every other
individual. In that possible situation there is no girl from s0 who was not there. This
means that the sentence is not defined.
(55) # Every girl was there except EvaF was there.
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(56) J(55)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[Eva was there in s→ ∃x[x is a girl in s0
& ¬ x was there in s]] & Eva was there in s0
The same goes for (57). The presupposition generated in this case is as shown in
(58). The first conjunct (in bold) is not true: it is not the case that in every situation
where Eva was not there there is a girl from s0 who was there. The presupposition is
not satisfied and the sentence is not defined.
(57) # No girl was there except EvaF was not there.
(58) J(57)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→ ∃x[x is a girl in s0
& x was there in s]] & ¬Eva was there in s0
6 Capturing the distributional facts
6.1 Existential quantifiers
In this section I show how the assumptions that I made about the meaning of except-
clauses correctly capture the fact that exceptives are not compatible with existential
quantifiers. I built on the existing approaches to the semantics of exceptives that
solve the distribution puzzle by deriving an ill-formed meaning when an exceptive is
put together with an existential quantifier (von Fintel 1994; Gajewski 2008; Hirsch
2016). I extend a similar approach to clausal exceptives.
Given the assumptions that I made about LFs of sentences with elliptical excep-
tives, when we interpret (59), the constituent the exceptive phrase combines with
has the denotation shown in (60).
(59) # Some girl was there except EvaF was not there.
(60) λ s’λ s”. ∃x[x is a girl in s’ & x was there in s”]
The interpretation predicted for the entire sentence is given in (61) (the presup-
position) and (62) (the assertive content).
(61) J(59)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→ ¬∃x[x is a girl in
s0 & x was there in s]] & ¬ Eva was there in s0
(62) J(59)Kg(s0) =1 iff ∃s[∀p[(p6=[λ s’.¬Eva was there in s’] & p∈JEvaF was not
thereKg,F)→ p(s)=p(s0)] & ∃x[x is a girl in s0 & x was there in s]]
The problem is with the first conjunct of the presupposition given in (61) (in
bold). It can be true in two cases: Eva is the only girl in s0 or there are no girls in s0.
If Eva is the only girl in s0, in every situation where Eva was not there, there is
no individual who is a girl in s0 who was there. If there is at least one other girl in
s0, say Anna, it cannot be true. This is because there is a possible situation where
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Eva is not there, but Anna is. The scenario where Eva is the only girl is ruled out
by a general principle that blocks the use of an indefinite determiner (such as a and
some) in a situation where the conditions for the use of a definite article are met,
specifically when it is known that the restrictor of an indefinite is a singleton set
(Hawkins 1991; Heim 1991). This is the principle that rules out (63) and (64).
(63) # I interviewed a father of the victim. (Hawkins 1991)
(64) # A weight of our tent is under 4 lbs. (Heim 1991)
The first conjunct of the presupposition in (61) (given in bold) can also be true if
there are no girls in s0 at all. In this scenario, in every situation there are no girls
from s0. This option, however, contradicts the predicted at-issue content in (62).
(62) says that there is a possible situation where someone who is a girl in s0 was
there. Thus, it can only be true if there are girls in s0.
Following Gajewski (2002), I assume that constructions that are predicted to
yield a contradictory meaning due to the combination of the functional elements
(some and except, in this case) are perceived as ungrammatical in natural languages.
I suggest that this is the reason why (59) is not well-formed.
6.2 Definite descriptions
I appealed to the competition between indefinites and definites in order to explain
the incompatibility of except with existentials. A naturally occurring question is why
except cannot operate on a definite description, as illustrated in (65). The meaning
predicted for (65) is given in (66) (the presupposition) and (67) (the assertion).
(65) # The girl was there except EvaF was not there.
(66) J(65)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[¬Eva was there in s→ ¬ιx[x is a girl in s0]
was there in s] & ¬Eva was there in s0
(67) J(65)Kg(s0) =1 iff ∃s[∀p[(p6=[λ s’.¬Eva was there in s’] & p∈JEvaF was not
thereKg,F)→ p(s)=p(s0)] & ιx[x is a girl in s0] was there in s]
The presupposition in (66) can only be satisfied if Eva and the girl have the same
referent in s0 and if Eva was not there in s0. The assertion in (67) states that there is a
possibility where the proposition [λ s.ιx[x is a girl in s0] was there in s] is true while
all the propositions of the form ‘x was not there’ (where x is not Eva) have the same
truth value as in s0. Note that we learn from the presupposition that [λ s.Eva was
there in s] and [λ s.ιx[x is a girl in s0] was there in s] are equivalent. Whether (67)
is true or not does not depend on s0 (it does not depend on the facts of the form ‘x
was not there’ where x is not Eva in s0). It only depends on whether the proposition
inside the exceptive clause is a necessary truth or not. Given the presupposition, the
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assertion in (67) is either true in every possible situation (that we plug in instead of
s0) or false in every possible situation. Since the proposition denoted by the sentence
following except ([λ s.¬Eva was here in s]) is not a necessary truth, in every possible
situation where the presupposition is satisfied, the sentence is going to be true. There
is no way for this sentence to be false. Following Gajewski (2002), I assume that
sentences that have a tautological meaning due to the combination of their functional
elements are perceived as ungrammatical in natural languages. If instead of Eva was
not there we had a sentence that denotes a necessary truth after except, the assertion
would be false in every possible situation where the sentence is defined.
Another factor that might be at play here is that the two clauses in (65) are not in
sufficient contrast for the ellipsis to be licensed. A remnant of ellipsis cannot refer to
the same individual as the corresponding expression in the antecedent (Rooth 1992;
Stockwell 2018; Griffiths 2019).
7 The analysis of a PP-case
The analysis developed here captures the example with the PP remnant from Barcelona
in the exceptive phrase repeated below as (68) in straightforward way. As was shown
above, this case presents a problem for previous theories of exceptives.
The LF I propose for this sentence is shown in (69).
(68) I met a student from every city in Spain except from Barcelona.
(69)
IP
IP
ExcP2
s5ExcP1
IP
I did not meet a student from BarcelonaF
except
IP
4IP
IP
IP
IP
IP
IP
vP
t1vP
s3met
I
1
DP
NP
s3N
PP
t2from
N
student
D
a
2
DP
NP
s4N
city in Spain
D
every
3
5
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In this LF, the complex quantificational object (a student from every city in Spain
except from Barcelona...) undergoes QR. Then, the DP with the universal quantifier
(every city in Spain except from Barcelona...) moves out of this phrase in order to
create the configuration where every city in Spain takes scope over a student. This
is necessary in order to create the meaning where for each city there is a different
student. Those two QR movements are standardly assumed operations. Following
what I have proposed in this paper, except-clause moves from its connected position,
leaves a trace of type s (s4). A binder of this trace (4) is merged in the syntax. For
simplicity, I reconstructed the PP inside the except-clause to its base-position inside
the object. The remnant of ellipsis inside the clause following except is focused
(BarcelonaF )7.
With those assumptions about the structure of the main clause, the sister of
Exceptive Phrase2 gets the interpretation given in (70).
(70) λ s.λ s’.∀x[x is a city in Spain in s→ ∃y[y is a student from x in s’ & I met y
in s’]]
The predicted resulting interpretation for the entire sentence is given in (71) (the
presupposition) and (72) (the assertion).
(71) J(69)Kg(s0) is defined only if ∀s[¬∃z[z is a student from Barcelona in s &
I met z in s]→ ∃x[x is a city in Spain in s0 & ¬∃y[y is a student from x in s
& I met y in s]]] & ¬∃b[b is a student from Barcelona s0 & I met b in s0]
(72) J(69)Kg(s0) =1 iff ∃s[∀p[(p6=λ s’.¬∃z[z is a student from Barcelona in s’
& I met z in s’] & p∈JI did not meet a student f rom BarcelonaFKg,F) →
p(s)=p(s0)] & ∀x[x is a city in Spain in s0→ ∃y[y is a student from x in s &
I met y in s]]]
The first conjunct of the presupposition in (71) says that in every situation where
I did not meet a student from Barcelona there is a thing that is a city in Spain in s0
such that I met no student from that city. This can only be the case if Barcelona is a
city in Spain in s0. The second one states that I met no student from Barcelona in s0.
Thus, the presupposition captures the containment and the negative inferences.
The assertion in (72) says that there is a situation where facts about me meeting
a student from places other than Barcelona are the same as in s0 and it is true that
every city in Spain in s0 is such that I met a student from it. The relevant restriction
for the quantification over possible situations is achieved via looking at situations
where the truth value of each the focus alternatives for I did not meet a student from
BarcelonaF other than the original (i.e. the propositions denoted by I did not meet
7 Again, the situation variables inside the except-clause and their binder are not shown here for
simplicity. The assumption is that they are present in the structure.
435
Vostrikova
a student from Madrid, I did not meet a student from Valencia, I did not meet a
student from Moscow, I did not meet a student from New York etc) is the same as in
s0. This captures the inference that I met a student from every city in Spain other
than Barcelona without directly subtracting Barcelona from the set of cities in Spain.
8 Plural remnants in except-clauses
In the discussion so far I have made a simplifying assumption that the remnant of
ellipsis in except-clauses is always an expression denoting an atomic individual. This
is, of course, not the case. A remnant can be plural as shown in (73). The analysis
presented so far does not capture the fact that there is a containment inference for
both Eva and Anna: they have to be girls. This is tested in (74) - the sentence is
infelicitous because John is a clearly male name. We also need to think about how
to model the domain subtraction in this case.
(73) Every girl was there except [Eva and Anna]F were not there.
(74) # Every girl was there except [Eva and John]F were not there.
My strategy here would be to find a way of going from the proposition denoted
by Eva and Anna were not there to the propositions denoted by Eva was not there
and Ana was not there. The set containing those two propositions is given in (75).
(75) {λ s.Eva was not there in s, λ s’.Anna was not there in s’}
Let’s assume that the focus value of the clause following except in (73) is as
shown in (76)8.
(76) {λ s. Eva was not there in s, λ s’. Anna was not there in s’, λ s”. Ivy was not
there in s”, λ s”’. Mary was not there in s”’, λ s. John was not there in s}
The meaning of (73) can be expressed via the three statements given in (77).
First, we state that what comes after except is true as shown in (77a). Second,
we establish a law-like relation between each of the proposition in (75) and the
quantificational claim, thus, capturing the inferences that Eva is a girl and Anna is a
girl (shown in (77b)). Third, we express the domain subtraction as shown in (77c):
there is a possible situation where all facts about people being there other than facts
about Eva and Ann are the same as in s0 and the quantificational claim is true.
(77) a. Eva and Anna were not there in s0
b. ∀p[p∈(75)→∀s[p(s)=1→¬∀x[x is a girl in s0→ x was there in s]]]
8 This is done for simplicity, the reasoning will not change here if we also include things like [λ s. Eva
and Mary were not there in s] in this set.
436
Semantics of clausal exceptives
c. ∃s[∀p[(p/∈(75) & p∈(76))→p(s)=p(s0)] & ∀x[x is a girl in s0 → x was
there in s]]
The question is how we get (75) given (76)? What separates those two proposi-
tions in (75) from all other focus alternatives in (76) is the fact that each of them is
entailed by Eva and Anna were not there. This is the fact that I use in the updated
denotation for an except-clause in (78). The law-like relationship is established not
between the clause following except and the quantificational claim, but between
each of the focus alternatives of the clause following except that is entailed by the
proposition denoted by the original sentence and the quantificational claim. A similar
change is in the assertive component responsible for the domain subtraction infer-
ence: we are looking at situations where the focus alternatives that are not entailed
by the original clause have the same truth value as in the situation of evaluation.
(78) Jexcept φKg =λ s’.λM<s<st>>: ∀p[(p∈JφKg,F&JφKg⊆p)→
∀s[p(s)=1→¬M(s’)(s)=1]] & JφKg(s’)=1.
∃s[∀p[(p∈JφKg,F&JφKg*p)→ p(s)=p(s’)] & M(s’)(s)=1]
As the reader can verify, the denotation in (78) also works for simpler cases
where the remnant is an individual denoting expression.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that English seemingly phrasal exceptive construction
introduced by except can be derived from clausal structures by ellipsis. Based on
NPI facts I have argued that there is a polarity mismatch between the main clause
containing quantification and the clause introduced by except. I have offered a
compositional semantic analysis for clausal exceptive constructions that captures
the inferences traditionally associated with exceptives and restrictions on their
use. The analysis I suggested here is conditional in some sense: I proposed that a
clausal exceptive introduces quantification over possible situations and provides the
restriction this quantification. I have proposed that a semantic relation between a
clause X introduced by except and a quantificational claim Y can be expressed via
the combination of three claims: X happened; in every situation where X happened,
Y is not true; had X not happened, Y would have been true. I have shown how
this analysis captures a case with a PP remnant in the except-phrase that previously
existing analyses did not capture, because they are based on the idea that an exceptive
introduces a set of individuals.
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